April 15, 1918  Troop Train Wrecked Leaving Camp Upton east of C. Islip

On April 15, 1918 one of many L.I.R.R. troop trains left Camp Upton and was heading westbound along the Main Line under the control of engineer Tom Kelly when it derailed at speed just east of Foot’s Crossing (the present day crossing of the Veterans’ Memorial Highway over the L.I.R.R. east of Central Islip).

Operator Ayling told me he found out soon afterwards that the wreck was a result of sabotage. He mentioned to me that the train was full of soldiers heading towards New York City  and there were many, many injuries. It was later determined that there were 3 soldiers dead and 36 soldiers injured. He said at the time I spoke with him, that he never heard another thing about the wreck.  For some reason, the railroad men never got the true story and it was kept quiet at the time. For many years afterward he was afraid to let anyone know that he even had photos of the wreck, for fear that he was breaking some sort of security.  I managed to obtain the negatives from him before he passed away. 

Had this happened today, the media would have been pouring all over the site with helicopter coverage and high-powered zoom lenses and we’d all be watching it on television.

And . . .. had George Ayling known the real reason for the wreck, he’d have slept easy. 

I recently acquired the official ICC report on this wreck and, despite George’s facts, which were obviously typical railroad-man rumor and hearsay of the day, the derailment was a result of defective rails.  The reason George never photographed the locomotive, was that it and the first three cars were still on the tracks.  Chances are, it was uncoupled from the fourth car whose rear truck had derailed, and left the scene to make way for the wreck train.

I’ve scanned the first portion of the ICC report for anyone interested in reading it.  It gets extremely technical (i.e. boring) for us non-engineers so at that point I skipped to the very end and scanned the engineer’s summary and closing statement.  The report follows George Ayling’s photos of the wreck.  Info: Dave Keller

Railroad workers walking past three derailed coaches and torn-up tracks

1921 Wreck of Cannonball west of Eastport 1921

August Friday 13, 1926    Golden’s Pickle Works in Calverton

Charlie's claim to fame was being (unfortunately) the engineer of  E51sa Camelback #2, the second locomotive of that infamous, eastbound double-header that split a switch on Friday, August 13, 1926 (yes, Friday the 13th for the superstitious) and plowed into Golden's Pickle Works, located trackside in Calverton.

The engine crew of the lead locomotive, D16sb #214 died horribly as they were pinned against the scalding hot firewall. Charlie and his fireman Bill Squires were thrown clear, but injured.  Charlie was flung from the cab through the cab's skylight which, luckily, was open to get some air and ventilation on that hot, humid, Long Island day in August, 1926. Info: Dave Keller

October 25, 1932   Wreck of the Cannonball East of Amagansett

Train #20, the “Cannonball” was making its regular trip eastbound to Montauk late in the season on October, 25, 1932.  Pulled by G5s (4-6-0) #50, the name train had dropped its last passenger off at Amagansett and the train crew all settled into the last car of the train for a quiet, dead-head ride to the end of the line at Montauk. Conductor Leo Hantz had his young son with him on the run and everyone was enjoying the ride, awaiting the end of the trip.

While rounding the curve near M.P. 114, just west of Montauk, the big G5s rolled over onto her side, burying engineer Frank Obremski in the right bank of the hillside.  Fireman Ed Koehler was thrown clear and climbed up the bank where we was found and rushed to Southampton hospital where he died of his injuries.  None of the train crew nor Leo’s son all riding in the last car were injured.

The first photo is of G5s #50, minus one of her domes, rolled over onto her side.  The second photo is of the passenger cars jackknifed.  It’s amazing that, miles from everywhere, on what is still a pretty deserted stretch of track, the quantity of gawkers that turned out to witness the disaster! 

The form 19 train order shown here was issued at PD tower on that very day and copied and made complete at 5:09 pm  by block operator Bruckner.  It identifies train #20, the “Cannonball” as being pulled by engine #50.

Photos, text, and train order are from the archive of:  Dave Keller

September 21, 1938    Wreck at Quogue

"The Hurricane of September 21, 1938 and the Long Island Rail Road Wreck at Fairy Dell** in Quogue, LI, NY" by Raymond Robinson, Jr.

Train #26, the evening mail train, left Pennsylvania Station NY at 4:7 pm, bound for Montauk.  It should have arrived at Speonk at 7:00 pm, but because some tress were down, it was a few minutes late.

The Conductor of this train was my father, Raymond G. Robinson.  He and the rest of the crew had rooms in Montauk, so they could take train #27 out in the morning.

On that day, the wind had been blowing out of the northeast.  It blew most of the water out of the bays and out to sea.  The eye of the storm passed over us and soon after, the wind change and came out of the southwest, causing the tidal-wave that washed out the roadbed from under the track.  The newspaper article stated that the wind had blown the train off the tracks, which, of course, was not true.

When the tidal-wave came rushing back, it washed out the fill and roadbed where the head waters of Quantuck Bay flowed under the tracks.  It left the rails and ties intact.  When train #26 came along, the engine and tender, a PRR K4s, made it across OK, but the mail car and two coaches left the rails.

My father was in the first coach, eating his lunch.  When the car laid over, his arm went through the window.  No one was seriously injured, so he moved all the passengers to the rear coach which was still upright.

In order to report the wreck, he had to walk back to the Westhampton station.  While there, he discovered his arm was cut, so someone took him to Dr. Keller (a local medical doctor) and they sewed up the wound under the light of a kerosene lamp.

It took several days to clear up the wreck and rebuild the roadbed.  I was told that they never found one of the trucks from the mail car, which was buried in the marsh.  Info: Ray Robinson, Jr.

(** Fairy Dell is approximately 600 feet west of the Old Country Road grade crossing, by the present-day Quogue Wildlife Refuge.)

The wreck was technically at Syosset as the derailment occurred east of the Syosset station, but west of “S” cabin, on the double track portion of the ROW and near an under-track drain culvert. North of the tracks were the sand pits that were excavated for the 1912-13 grade elimination project at Jamaica .

There was a heavy rainstorm and, due to the proximity of this excavation to the tracks, a washout occurred. Westbound train #647, pulled by PRR K4s #5406 derailed on September 14, 1944 as a result of this washout.  Dave Keller Historical Information

Wreck of Train #4612 at Kings Park - February 16, 1947: All photos and info: Dave Keller Archives

It was approaching noon on Sunday, February 16, 1947 and train #4612 was being pulled eastbound towards Port Jefferson by leased Pennsylvania Railroad K4s (4-6-2) #5406.  The train was due to make a station stop at Kings Park at 12:08 pm then continue on to its final destination of Port Jefferson.  

The huge locomotive and train was almost at Harrison Avenue , the first crossing west of the station when it derailed, dragging the train across Harrison Avenue and onto the State Hospital spur access siding and rolled off the tracks onto the north side of the main, burrowing itself into the ground in front of the village’s tall community water tower, sending rails and ties and wheels everywhere, jack-knifing passenger cars in the process.

The New York Daily News account at the time stated the train ran a stop signal, hit an open switch and derailed at 12:07 pm. Engineer Walter A. Samb, 51, of Miller Place admitted to investigators that he saw the signal several hundred feet before the switch but couldn’t brake in time.  He said he got a clear order at Greenlawn eleven minutes earlier.

The crew of the preceding Kings Park State Hospital train, #4608, which was scheduled to arrive at Kings Park at 11:12, having taken the siding just west of Harrison Avenue and then making its final stop at the state hospital north of Route 25A at 11:22 am, was being questioned to determine responsibility for the open switch.

The eleven-car train hit the switch at 40 miles-per-hour and derailed.  The momentum carried the locomotive and train 250 feet, coming to a stop in front of the trackside water tower for the community of Kings Park .  Six coaches were derailed, and the newspaper reported in the same article that 31, 48 or 50 were injured, 10 seriously, so I have no idea of the actual count.  The fortunate thing, though, was that there were no deaths.

The other crew members identified in the report were Conductor John H. Hastings, 46, of Port Jefferson and Fireman Alfred A. King of Easthampton .

This is an aerial view shortly after the wreck and was taken by a Daily News photographer.  The wreck train has not yet arrived on the scene.  The view is looking from the south side of the tracks, northwest and pretty much sums up the entire situation facing the wreck crew.  One upright car on the south siding (how did that get there?), locomotive and other cars on the Kings Park Hospital spur siding north of the main  and jack-knifed cars across all three tracks, with Harrison Avenue crossing in the background.

An elevated view from the Kings Park village water tower, also taken by a Daily News photographer. It is looking from the north side of the tracks southeast. 

The wreck crane is being put into position by a G5s drafted for emergency wreck service.  The view is from the south side of the tracks looking west and two derailed cars are about to get the attention of the two work cranes:  this one in the photo and the one behind the photographer as is evidenced in the next photo.  Both coaches are off their trucks and, in the right foreground behind the men can be seen one of the heavy-duty trucks off the Kiesel tender.  Interesting position, considering the tender wound up behind and north of the locomotive!  Steel was flying everywhere!

View from the south side of the tracks looking east, and shows both wreck cranes connected to the wrecked coach which is in mid-air, about to be swung back onto the re-railed trucks for transport back to Morris Park Shops.

LIRR #5406 and the two cars looking from the south side of the tracks westward, towards the scene of the derailment.  The two passenger cars have been set back on their trucks and are awaiting a trip to Morris Park Shops.  The tender is missing, and the locomotive is yet to be righted.  Much of the mess has been cleared up and the coaches that didn’t derail had been removed previously from the site to allow for the clean up.  Judging by the previous aerial view, the tender is probably still sitting at a skew behind the cab of the locomotive and is not visible from this angle.  At the left you can see bonfires started in the frozen nearby field to keep the chill away from the wreck workers.  Now it’s time to begin work on the K4s!
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LIRR #5406 looking from the north side of the tracks eastward.  It shows the damage done as the locomotive dug in and the rails are sticking up in the air.  A westbound passenger train is proceeding past the wreck on the main and in the distance can be seen the wreck train containing bunk and work cars for the men who will stay on the site for however long it will take to get the mess cleaned up and cleared away.

LIRR #5406 looking from the south side of the tracks eastward.  It shows two wreck cranes, the one in the foreground belonging to the Pennsylvania Railroad.  The one in the background is unidentifiable and may be that of the LIRR.  Both cranes are hooked up to the heavy locomotive and are about to hoist her up and onto the good trackage of the adjacent main.

Two cars from the wreck in storage in the yard behind Morris Park Shops two months later, on April 26, 1947.  The car shown in its entirety appears to be #339. 

Feb 17 1950 Both Engineers survived. 32 passengers died. LIRR trains #192 and #175  

This map indicates the location of the accident.

Rockville Centre - Robert Emery Map c.1950

August 5, 1950 Huntington LIRR #642, Pass Train First-Class Eastbound

"The People's Almanac" (Wallachinsky and Wallace, 1975, p. 564) gives the following very detailed description of what happened:

William W. Murphy, a 45-year veteran of railroading and just 4 years away from retirement, responded to the "restricted" signal on "C" tower 2 miles before the train's first scheduled stop at Jamaica. With the signal’s change to "approach," Murphy resumed his 30-mph speed. The next signal light on "J" (for Jamaica) tower showed "restricted" and again Murphy applied the air brakes. They grabbed and wouldn't release. Train 780 and its 12 cars carrying 1,000 homeward-bound passengers ground to a dead stop. Brakeman Bertram N. Biggam started to get the flares to put behind the stalled train.

Close behind on the same mainline track, Train 174 with 12 cars and 1,200 passengers thundered toward Jamaica. Motorman Benjamin J. Pokorny obeyed the signal at "C" tower and brought his train to a halt. When the signal changed, he accelerated to 15 mph. In back of him the "C" tower signal changed again back to "restricted," but ahead the signal on "J" tower flashed "approach." Train 174 resumed full speed. Too late Pokorny saw the stopped train ahead. In his last seconds of life he pulled the brake cord . . .

Neither train was equipped with an automatic repeater signal system, an electronic device mounted in the motorman's cab. Murphy and Pokorny had to rely on signal towers spaced at intervals along their route. Normally this signal-light system worked fine, but if a signal changed after a train had passed a tower, the system didn't work at all. Pokorny should have seen the taillights of the stalled train, if they were on. And that raised an unanswered question, for in a report by the Long Island Railroad to the Public Service Commission it was reported that within a 7-day period the taillights on 50 trains had been inoperative. . .

Passengers aboard Train 174 suffered their annoyance in silence. It wouldn't be the 1st time they had arrived home late. There was no warning of danger until the headlight of train 174 bathed the last car in its blinding glare. In seconds the two cars were fused together. The front car of Pokorny's train telescoped the rear of Murphy's train. Those not killed outright were overcome with fear. The trains were dark. Bedlam reigned inside the cars. People physically capable of moving couldn't because of the pileup of dead and injured bodies.

The noise of the collision was heard on 126th Street and Hillside Avenue. Soon help arrived, but it was an hour and 20 minutes before the last passenger was extricated from the bent and twisted cars. Amputations were performed on the spot and acetylene torches were used to free many trapped passengers. Priests administered last rites while doctors administered plasma. For hundreds of New Yorkers the tragedy turned Thanksgiving Day, 1950, into the blackest of black Thursdays. 

Joe DeMay’s great info on this accident:  www.oldkewgardens.com

On a stretch of track east of the Kew Gardens Long Island Rail Road Station, a night-time New York to Hempstead commuter train came to a stop because its brakes would not release. As its motorman began working on the problem, a brakeman got out of the rear car and stood on the tracks holding a red lantern to warn any approaching train of its presence. Because there was no automatic stopping mechanism on these tracks, the Railroad's operating rules required the brakeman to do this whenever his train was stopped under circumstances in which it might be overtaken by another train. The brakeman was obligated under those rules to "insure full protection" of his train, and if necessary to accomplish that, he was to display a lighted "fusee" or put down "torpedos".

Note: A "fusee" is a type of flare which burns bright red for 10 - 15 minutes. It is very similar to the flares Highway Patrolmen put around the scene of a traffic accident. "Torpedos" are explosive caps fastened to the top of the rail and exploded by the pressure of a rolling wheel. They warn a motorman of danger ahead. A "brakeman" (also called a trainman") is the lowest ranking member of a train crew. His duties are to assist the conductor in anyway possible. Despite what the title suggests, a 1950 Long Island Rail Road brakeman was not responsible for the good working order of the train's brakes.

Press accounts in the aftermath of the collision had the Babylon train going 60 to 65mph at the time it hit. However, the Interstate Commerce Commission investigated the collision and found the speed at impact was about 30mph. Had the Babylon train been going 60mph or more, the resulting devastation would have been much worse and most likely other cars in the two trains would have separated or derailed. That did not happen. Only slight damage was suffered by the other cars all of which remained connected and on track.

The cause of the crash was officially determined to be disregard of the Go Slow signal by the deceased motorman of the Babylon train. He should have followed the Go Slow signal he had just passed rather than the All Clear signal a half mile ahead. However, the Interstate Commerce Commission's Report on the crash seemed to imply that the brakeman on the Hempstead train had not done all he could have to protect his train - a conclusion I find unavoidable given that the brakeman extinguished his warning lantern and returned to the train before being signaled to do so. It was a clear night, and the brakeman assumed at the time that no train would approach at more than 15mph. So he thought the risk of a casualty was remote. He miscalculated, just as the motorman of the Babylon train miscalculated.

The crash occurred only nine months after a head on collision between two Long Island Rail Road trains at Rockville Centre, NY killed 31 and injured 158. According to The Long Island Press newspaper, the two accidents caused the public to view to the Long Island Rail Road as unsafe and irresponsible. Queens District Attorney Charles P. Sullivan called it the "Death Valley Railroad." The disaster led to public demands for increased government scrutiny. Yet, blame for what happened that night extended beyond the Railroad's management to the very State Government that was called upon to take action.

Because the Long Island Rail Road was a monopoly, it was subject to regulation by the New York State Public Service Commission. The Commission had refused to allow the Railroad any rate increases for almost 30 years (1918 - 1947) despite the L.I.R.R.'s increased operating costs and resulting heavy losses. Furthermore, because people always had the option of taking their cars rather than the train, the Long Island Rail Road had to compete for the public's transportation dollars with the various New York State authorities that owned and operated the bridges, tunnels and highways. Unlike the Long Island Rail Road which was heavily taxed in all respects, those authorities paid no tax whatsoever on their real estate, assets or income. Moreover, bridges, tunnels and highways cost much less to maintain than a railroad. All of that left the Long Island Rail Road at a permanent competitive disadvantage, and every effort to level the playing field by providing badly needed subsidies for the Railroad was defeated in the State Legislature.

The result of that kind of transportation policy should not have been hard to foresee. By 1950, the Railroad was starved for cash and it's equipment was old and decrepit. The two cars involved in the crash were Class MP54A and had been built in 1910, more than 40 years earlier. Such cars were the rule, not the exception. One newspaper reporter cracked that if the Long Island Rail Road were a model train set, it would make a little boy cry to find it under his Christmas Tree. On the date of the collision, the Long Island Rail Road had already filed for bankruptcy reorganization and was operating under the supervision of two bankruptcy trustees. Two days after the crash, Governor Dewey told The Brooklyn Eagle newspaper that $50,000,000 was needed just to make the Long Island Rail Road, "reasonably safe and to insure something approaching satisfactory operation." That was money the perennially cash poor Railroad just did not have, and the State Government had mostly itself to blame for the situation.

In the aftermath of the crash, Automatic Speed Control (ASC) was installed on the tracks. The Pennsylvania Railroad (which owned the Long Island Rail Road) agreed to terminate the L.I.R.R.s bankruptcy and begin a 12 year, 58 million dollar improvement program. The L.I.R.R. gained exemption from much of its tax burden and the freedom to charge realistic fares.

The point of impact for the collision was 1,960 feet east of the Kew Gardens Long Island Rail Road Station near 125th Street - one block west of the Metropolitan Avenue overpass. Although press accounts at the time described that area as Richmond Hill, neighborhood boundaries have long since changed. Today, the site of the collision is considered to be in Kew Gardens.

1967 LIRR RDC Wrecked 

January 25, 1969  LIRR PASSENGER TRAIN # 4186  Tunnel 3 East River

June 23, 1969, East End of Pennsylvania Station

Some time before the accident, passenger train equipment was placed on Pennsylvania Station track 21 for temporary storage. Anticipating that station forces would remove this equipment before arrival of passenger train No. 751, a Long Island Rail Road yardmaster instructed the C interlocking operator to route No. 751 to station track 21. However, due to station forces experiencing difficulty with its air brake system, the passenger train equipment still occupied track 21 when No. 751 neared the station.

No. 751, a westbound passenger train consisting of seven electrically-propelled passenger cars left Hempstead, L. I., at 2:09 p.m. When the train stopped at Woodside, the conductor, acting without authority but in accordance with what appears to be a common practice, went home after arranging for an off-duty employee, a ticket collector, to replace him for the remainder of the trip to Pennsylvania Station. The ticket collector had been a conductor at one time, but had been disqualified from working in that capacity since 1962 because of a physical condition. No. 751 left Woodside without the engineer knowing the regularly assigned conductor had left the train.

About 2:55 p.m., after proceeding through the East River Tunnels on track No. 4 and entering C interlocking, No. 751 began to enter Pennsylvania Station track 21 at slow speed. The engineer then saw that track 21 was occupied by passenger train equipment, and stopped his train with the front end about 170 feet short of that equipment and 160 feet from the track platform. The rear end stopped within C interlocking limits. After the train stopped, it waited for station forces to remove the equipment from the track ahead.

No. 159, a westbound Long Island Rail Road passenger train consisting of 8 electrically-propelled passenger cars, left Babylon, L. I. at 1:49 p.m. About 2:53 p.m., while moving on track No. 4, it entered the East River Tunnels and continued toward Pennsylvania Station, following No. 751 at an interval of about three minutes. Seven minutes later, No. 159 stopped on track No. 4 at the C interlocking home signal, which indicated Stop due to the rear end of No. 751 occupying its track circuit. The engineer saw No. 751 standing about 200-250 feet ahead, and waited for the home interlocking signal to display a proceed aspect.

Approximately five minutes after stopping short of the passenger train equipment occupying station track 21, the engineer of No. 751, in response to a request of three off-duty employees, began to move his train slowly forward toward the east end of the track platform, causing loud electrical arcing sounds at the locations of the third-rail contact shoes on the cars. As the train moved forward, the communicating whistle sounded two short blasts (when moving, a signal to stop) and the engineer stopped the train a few feet short of the platform. A few seconds later, according to his statements, the engineer heard the communicating whistle sound three short blasts (when standing, a signal to back up) and looked into the passenger compartment of the first car for the conductor, but did not see him. Assuming the conductor had obtained authority for the reverse movement and had gone to the rear of the last car to protect the reverse movement, the engineer started to back his train through C interlocking without stationing himself at the controls of the leading car in the direction of the reverse movement, as required by the carrier's rules. The engineer stated that on two separate occasions after starting the reverse movement, the communicating whistle sounded three short blasts (when moving, a signal to stop at the next station). He construed these whistle signals as being confirmations of the first signal to back up. The train continued its reverse movement through C interlocking and, about 3:05 p.m., backed onto track No. 4 of the four-track line. Immediately thereafter, while moving backward at about 10 m.p.h. it struck No. 159, which was standing on track No. 4 a few feet east of the home interlocking signal.

Statements of the three off-duty employees in the vestibule at the front of the train substantiate those made by the engineer of No. 751 relating to the communicating whistle signals sounded before the collision.

The off-duty ticket collector, who was acting as the train conductor, was in the vestibule at the rear of the first car when No. 751 began to move in reverse. He heard the communicating whistle signals received by the engineer and took no exception to the reverse movement.

The flagman of No. 751 was in the vestibule at the front of the 6th car while his train waited on Pennsylvania Station track 21 for station forces to remove passenger train equipment from the track ahead. When his train moved slowly forward toward the station platform, intermittent arcing noise occurred at the locations of the third rail contact shoes. (The investigation revealed it is common practice for LI Rail Road engineers to use arcing sound, instead of train horn sound as required by rule, when recalling a flagman out providing protection against following trains. This is accomplished by setting the train brakes, then applying and shutting off power the number of times specified for the horn signal prescribed for recalling flagmen). Upon hearing the arcing noise, the flagman pulled the communicating whistle cord twice (when stopped, a signal to proceed; when moving, a signal to stop), intending this as a signal that he was on the train and not out providing protection against following trains. Since the train was moving when this signal was sounded, the engineer construed it to be a stop signal and promptly stopped the train, a few feet from the track platform and the passenger-train equipment ahead.

Apparently realizing that he had unintentionally caused the train to stop, the flagman again pulled the communicating whistle cord to signal the engineer to proceed. However, instead of sounding two short whistle blasts, he apparently sounded three short blasts (when standing, a signal to back up), resulting in the engineer moving the train in reverse. The reverse movement startled the flagman, and he pulled the communicating-whistle cord with the intention of signalling the engineer to stop. Instead of sounding two short whistle blasts, it appears he again sounded three short blasts (when moving, a signal to stop at the next station), resulting in the engineer assuming this was a confirmation of the first signal to back up and continuing the reverse movement. The flagman then decided to go to the rear vestibule of the 6th car, apparently with the intention of operating the emergency brake valve or the communicating-whistle signal apparatus in that vestibule. While going through the car, he again pulled the communicating-whistle cord with the intention of sounding a Stop signal and with the same result as described above. A few seconds later, No. 751 backed onto track No. 4 and struck No. 159.

Approximately 175 passengers and employees of both trains sustained injuries, which were primarily of the abrasion, contusion, sprain, and neck-whiplash types. Most injuries were relatively minor in nature. Numerous injured passengers were transported to hospitals for first aid Best available information indicates that three passengers were injured seriously enough to require hospitalization. Historical Data: Kyle V. Mullins

June 23, 1969 LIRR PASSENGER TRAIN #850 FIRE at Elmhurst

No. 850, an eastbound passenger train consisting of seven electrically-propelled passenger cars, was scheduled to leave Pennsylvania Station at 4:39 p.m. It was delayed in leaving, however, because of a collision between LI Rail Road trains at the east end of the station at 3:05 p.m. During the delay, passengers continued to board No. 850 until all its seats and standing room in the aisles and vestibules were fully, occupied. About 1,100 passengers boarded the train, according to estimates.

No. 850 left Pennsylvania Station at 5:50 p.m., 1 hour 11 minutes late, and proceeded eastward through one of the East River Tunnels to Long Island. Shortly after it emerged from the tunnel, wind forces caused a thin piece of metal (3 1/2" x 24") to fly up from the wayside and to lodge on the south side of the rear truck of the 7th (last) car, between the third-rail contact shoe hanger and the truck equalizer. This created a short circuit and an electrical arc between the third-rail contact shoe assembly and the truck frame or a journal box, igniting the lubricating material in the journal box. Shortly after passing Harold, L. I., at 5:56 p.m., the flagman noticed smoke arising from underneath the rear of the 7th car and signaled the engineer to stop.

When the train stopped, the flagman and front brakeman examined the rear truck of the 7th car and saw that the lubricating material in the journal box of the rear wheel on the south side of the truck was on fire. After making an unsuccessful search for a fire extinguisher on the train, the front brakeman extinguished the fire by stuffing a wet cloth into the journal box. He then returned to the front of the train and informed the conductor that the 7th car had an overheated journal (hot box). Soon afterward, the train proceeded eastward without either the flagman or front brakeman having noticed the strip of thin metal lodged on the rear truck of the 7th car.

No. 850 passed Win interlocking station in the Elmhurst section of Long Island at 6:12 p.m., while moving at a speed of about 30 m.p.h. About that time, the flagman heard loud explosive-type sounds caused by electrical arcing at the location of the rear truck of the 7th car. He then saw smoke and flames rising from the truck, and signaled the engineer to stop. As the engineer reduced speed to stop at a wayside telephone a short distance ahead, a passenger pulled the cord of the emergency brake valve in a car, stopping the train before it reached the wayside telephone.

Panic immediately developed among passengers in the 7th car when smoke and fire from the rear truck were seen to be rising above the south side of the car. At that time, the flagman opened the door on the south side of the rear vestibule of the 7th car to permit passengers to escape. Not being able to proceed forward through the car because of its crowded condition, the flagman alighted from the rear vestibule, ran forward along the south side of the car to the front vestibule, and opened the south door of that vestibule. While attempting to open the trap door over the steps, he was thrown to the ground by passengers leaving the car in panic. In the meantime, ticket collectors in the fourth car alighted from the train, saw what was happening, and ran to the rear alongside the train, opening doors on the south side of vestibules in the cars.

While passengers were evacuating the train, the conductor ran ahead to the wayside telephone and requested assistance. This resulted in power to the third rail being shut off at 6:21 p.m., about 20 or 25 minutes after the train stopped. About 6:18 p.m., fire and police department forces from several nearby communities arrived at the scene.

Immediately after the train stopped, passengers in the last car began to break out windows and jump to the ground. When the vestibule doors were opened, passengers jumped to the ground from unopened trap doors above the steps.

Eleven passengers were known to be injured as a result of jumping from the 6th and 7th cars through windows and/or unopened trap doors. Six other passengers subsequently claimed injury. Most injuries were of minor nature, consisting primarily of lacerations, contusions, abrasions, and sprains. Two passengers were hospitalized, one for a fractured ankle, the other for a back injury. Historical Data: Kyle V. Mullins

August 26, 1988 LIRR Passenger Train Crash Huntington, NY

March 11, 2004  LIRR #160 Runaway

September 20, 2007 

Posted Info:  Steven Lynch 09/20/2007

March 27, 2008 LIRR PASSENGER TRAINS at JAMAICA

LIRR indicates the Huntington train was already in the station and the Hempstead train was just pulling in and didn't cross over the tracks onto track 8 properly, when the derailment occurred. The rear 2 cars derailed and collided with the Huntington train on track 7.  WWOR TV reports 20 minor injuries.